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IED Working Paper 2Abstract
Regulating international externalities, like climate change, raises various enforce-
ment problems. It is often argued that international price-based regulations (e.g.
emission taxes) are more diﬃcult to enforce than quantity-based regulations (e.g.
tradable pollution permits). In this paper, we analyze the relative performance of
price-based and quantity-based instruments when costs and beneﬁts are uncertain
and enforcement of quantity regimes is stricter than that of price regimes. We show
that under these conditions, instrument choice solely based on the relative slopes
of the marginal curves can yield ineﬃcient results. If policy enforcement diﬀers,
rational policy choice should also take into account the level of the marginal beneﬁt
curve, as well as institutional parameters. In contrast to earlier analyses on "Prices
vs. Quantities", we ﬁnd that the choice of instrument also depends on the vari-
ance of the marginal abatement costs. Numerical simulations of our stylized model
suggest that, for climate policies, quantity-regulations might well be preferable to
price-based approaches after all.
Keywords: market-based instruments, incomplete enforcement, uncertainty, en-
vironmental regulation
JEL classiﬁcation: D8, L51, K42, Q58
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1 Introduction
In the last few decades, there has been an ongoing debate among environmental
economists on the relative performance of price-based (e.g. a carbon tax) and
quantity-based (e.g. tradable pollution permits) instruments. From the point of
eﬃciency, both regulatory policies perform equally well if costs and beneﬁts from
pollution abatement are known. However, as Weitzman (1974) showed, the perfor-
mance of price-based and quantity-based instruments can diﬀer if costs and beneﬁts
are subject to uncertainty. Furthermore, the eﬃciency of environmental policies is
altered signiﬁcantly if they are considered under the more realistic assumption of
incomplete enforcement (Montero (1999, 2002)).
Policy enforcement is of particular importance in the context of international
regulations, such as the international climate policy framework. The Kyoto Proto-
col, for example, being based on a quantity approach has been severely criticized
on the basis of the "relative slope criterion" derived in Weitzman (1974).1 This
criterion indicates that the choice of instrument is determined by the relative slopes
of the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost curves. Given the estimated marginal
curves in the context of regulating CO2 emissions, a price regulation dominates a
quantity-based approach in terms of eﬃciency.2 In contrast, it is often argued that
enforcement of price-based instruments on the international level is signiﬁcantly
lower than that of quantity regulations.3 Both arguments are strong and plausible.
The net eﬀect of uncertainty on the one hand, recommending the use of taxes to
regulate CO2 emissions, on the other hand diﬀering enforceability, which would sug-
gest quantity instruments, is unclear. Despite the fact that this has been frequently
noted in the literature, a formalization of this problem has not yet been attempted.
In this paper we address the question of instrument choice when: costs and beneﬁts
are uncertain and enforcement of quantity-based instruments is stricter than that
of price-based instruments.
In environmental economics it is well known that the eﬃciency of price-based
and quantity-based instruments can diﬀer if beneﬁts and costs are uncertain. The
discussion on Prices vs. Quantities under uncertainty started with the seminal paper
Weitzman (1974). Weitzman uses linear approximations for the marginal curves and
assumes uncorrelated and additive uncertainty, aﬀecting the level but not the slope
of the marginal curves. Weitzman demonstrated that the slopes of the marginal
beneﬁt and marginal cost curve determine the relative performance of the regula-
tory instruments. A price regime provides a higher expected social welfare than a
quantity-based approach as long as the marginal cost curve is relatively steeper than
the marginal beneﬁt curve. Quantity-based instruments ought to be preferred in
the opposite case. Yet, Weitzman pointed out that the relative slope criterion has
to be altered if uncertainties are correlated4 and if the slopes of the marginal curves
themselves are subject to uncertainty.5 Malcomson (1978) and Weitzman (1978)
reconsider Weitzman’s initial approach if a linear approximation of the marginal
curves is not appropriate. Later contributions to the Prices vs. Quantities debate
stick to the assumptions of linearly approximable marginal curves with uncorre-
1See for example Nordhaus (2007).
2See for example Hoel and Karp (2002), and Newell and Pizer (2003).
3See for example Wiener (1999).
4See Stavins (1996) for a detailed discussion on Prices vs. Quantities with correlated uncertainty.
5See Laﬀont (1977) and Malcomson (1978) for a modiﬁcation of the initial relative slope
criterion if the slope of the marginal curves is uncertain.
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lated and additive uncertainty. Quirion (2004), for example, considers the presence
of pre-distortionary taxes. Stranlund and Ben-Haim (2008) analyze the choice of
instrument under Knightian uncertainty. Moledina et al. (2003) compare price-
and quantity-based instruments when ﬁrms behave strategically. Newell and Pizer
(2003), and Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) analyze instrument choice in the presence
of stock pollution under additive and multiplicative uncertainty and suggest using
price instruments to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.6 Fell et al. (2008) analyze
Prices vs. Quantities under the assumption of bankability of emission certiﬁcates.
There is a growing literature on the problem of incomplete enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations. The analyses take into account that polluters have incentives
to misstate their actual emission budget. This strain of literature is considered as
a direct extension of the economics of crime, which is based on Becker (1968), as
well as on the subsequently established economics of tax evasion (Allingham and
Sandmo (1972)). The ﬁrst enforcement model on environmental policies is pre-
sented in Downing and Watson (1974). Harford (1978), Viscusi and Zeckhauser
(1979), and Harford (1987) provide an analysis on ﬁrms’ behavior under incompletely
enforceable environmental tax schemes and pollution standards. Harrington (1988)
models the interaction between enforcement agencies and ﬁrms in a repeated game
under the assumption of limited possibility of sanctions. The eﬀects of incomplete
compliance on a market for tradable pollution permits are derived in Malik (1990).
Livernois and McKenna (1999) consider a case of pollution standards with diﬀer-
ent ﬁnes for noncompliance. The eﬃciency issue of diﬀerent policy instruments is
analyzed in Sandmo (2002) for risk-neutral as well as for risk-averse actors.7
A formal attempt to simultaneously analyze the choice of instrument under
uncertainty and incomplete enforcement in the context of environmental regulations
is presented in Montero (1999, 2002). In these analyses, the debate on Prices vs.
Quantities takes into account that depending on the regime, polluters either evade
taxes or hold an insuﬃcient amount of pollution permits. The result is an altered
version of the initial relative slope criterion, derived in Weitzman (1974). The
relative slopes of the marginal curves remain the crucial variables for the choice of
instrument. Yet, incomplete enforcement increases the set of situations in which
quantity-based regulation ought to be preferred. Incomplete enforcement softens a
quantity approach as the amount of emission reductions becomes uncertain in the
presence of noncompliant actors.
In this paper we formally analyze the eﬀect of an additional problem which arises
in the context of instrument choice for international regulations. This is being ap-
plied to the regulation of CO2 emissions. It is often argued that on the international
level the enforcement of quantity-based instruments is stricter than that of price-
based instruments. Such preconditions alter signiﬁcantly the relative performance
of both policy instruments. Note, on the international level regulated actors are
sovereign states and not ﬁrms or private entities. The sovereignty of countries im-
plies that governments can deﬁne their ﬁscal policies independently of the decisions
of a supra-national Regulatory Agency (RA hereafter) mandated to implement and
enforce a global regulatory instrument. On the international level, in addition to
6Yet, hybrid instruments perform better than either price-based or quantity-based instruments in
their pure form (Roberts and Spence (1976)). Pizer (2002) shows the superiority of a combination
of both instruments, e.g. a tradable permit system including a ’safety valve’, in the case of
regulating GHG emissions.
7See Cohen (1999) for a detailed survey on monitoring problems and incomplete enforcement
in environmental policies.
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misrepresenting their actual emissions, polluters can also undermine the incentive
eﬀect of a price-based instrument: a situation known as ’ﬁscal cushioning’ (Wiener
(1999), Wiener (2001), Aldy et al. (2008)). For example, countries levy a global
carbon tax and formally comply with the international obligations. At the same
time, countries can use ﬁscal revenues to reduce other taxes which indirectly tax
carbon (e.g. fuel duty) or increase subsidies for carbon intense production processes
(e.g. coal subsidies).8 Yet, it can be reasonably assumed that a country’s leeway
to oﬀset the incentive eﬀect of an international levy is not without limits. Coun-
tries might still face international sanctions, like punitive tariﬀs, when their de facto
noncompliance to the regulation is discovered. However, even if the RA observes a
reduction of the emission levy’s incentive eﬀect, the respective country can argue
that cuts in fuel taxes or a raise in subsidies on carbon intense production processes
is motivated by domestic industrial policy objectives. Furthermore, national tax
schemes are often quite inscrutable which further decreases the probability of detec-
tion (Aldy et al. (2008)). In contrast, the mechanism of quantity-based regulations,
where a pre-determined amount of pollution permits is allocated to the individual
countries, cannot be directly undermined by national governments. In such systems,
once the emissions trading system is in place, the overall scarcity of pollution per-
mits is ﬁxed. This reduces the possibilities of a country’s uncooperative behavior
to the case where a country simply misstates its actual emissions. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to represent the enforcement problem that is imminent on the
international level by attributing a lower enforcement probability to the price-based
instrument than to the quantity-based instrument.
We therefore extend the framework established in Montero (1999) and derive the
expected diﬀerence in social welfare of price-based over quantity-based regulations
assuming stricter enforcement of quantity instruments. It is, a priori, not clear
whether price-based or quantity-based instruments ought to be preferred in such a
situation. On the one hand, stricter enforcement, i.e. an increase in the enforcement
probability, reduces the advantage of quantity instruments identiﬁed by Montero
(1999, 2002). On the other hand, stricter enforcement of a quantity approach
increases net beneﬁts from emission reductions in comparison to a price regime, as
the second-best outcome under incomplete enforcement moves closer to the ex-ante
ﬁrst-best solution (complete enforcement). This latter eﬀect is co-determined by
level eﬀects as well as institutionally determined variables. The main purpose of this
paper is to analyze the relative strength of these two countervailing eﬀects. It turns
out that solely considering the relative slope criterion is insuﬃcient for a rational
instrument choice. Furthermore, we show that there exists a threshold level of the
variance of the marginal abatement costs below which the relative-slope criterion is
no longer relevant, as quantity instruments are always preferable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce
the basic setup of the model. Section three determines the countries’ compliance
strategy under incomplete enforcement. The optimal policy design under incom-
plete enforcement is presented in section four. The central question of the relative
8This argument is also laid out in Victor (2001), stating:"In practice, it would be extremely
diﬃcult to estimate the practical eﬀect of the tax, which is what matters. For example, countries
could oﬀset a tax on emissions with less visible compensatory policies that oﬀer loopholes for energy-
intensive and export-oriented ﬁrms that would be most adversely aﬀected by the new carbon tax.
The resulting goulash of prior distortions, new taxes, and political patches could harm the economy
and also undermine the goal of making countries internalize the full cost of their greenhouse gas
emissions." (Victor (2001), p. 86)
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diﬀerence in expected social welfare for both instruments is analyzed in section ﬁve.
We present numerical simulations for plausible parameter values in section six and
an extension of the model to a diﬀerent enforcement policy in section seven. The
last section concludes the paper.
2 Model
We develop an extension of the one-period model presented in Montero (1999) to
analyze instrument choice under diﬀerent enforcement probabilities for price- and
quantity-based regulations.
We assume the existence of an international RA that implements either a price- or
quantity-based instrument to induce a reduction in global emissions of a uniform
pollutant. Several countries of mass 1 are aﬀected by this policy measure. Let
t be the corresponding tax under a price regime and l the amount of certiﬁcates
distributed by the RA under a quantity regime.
For simplicity, following Montero (1999), each country discharges one unit of
emissions. Countries can abate pollution at constant marginal costs c, which diﬀer
across countries. The set of countries can be ranked continuously according to
the level of abatement costs over the interval [c;c]. Marginal abatement costs are
assumed to be uniformly distributed with the continuous distribution function g(c)
and the cumulative distribution function G(c). Both functions are known to the
welfare maximizing regulator and the countries, while speciﬁc marginal abatement
costs are the countries’ private information.
The RA can calculate the expected aggregated abatement costs C and beneﬁts B.
Costs and beneﬁts depend on the expected amount of global emission reductions
q. Following Weitzman (1974), Baumol and Oates (1988) and Montero (1999),
we use quadratic approximations for the abatement cost and beneﬁt curve. Cost
and beneﬁt uncertainty enters additively into the linear marginal curves, aﬀecting
the level but not the slope of the marginal curves.9 The marginal cost and beneﬁt
curves under uncertainty are hence
∂C(q,θ)
∂q
= (c + θ) + C′′q
∂B(q,η)
∂q
= (b + η) + B′′q,
where C′′ > 0, c ≡ C′(0), B′′ < 0 and b ≡ B′(0) are ﬁxed coeﬃcients. Further-
more, it is assumed that B′(0) > C′(0) and C′(q) > B′(q) for a suﬃciently large
q, which rules out corner solutions to the regulator’s optimization problem. θ is
a random shock to marginal costs and η respectively a random shock to marginal
beneﬁts. Let E[θ] = 0, E[θ2] = σ2
θ and E[η] = 0, E[η2] = σ2
η be the expected
value and the variance of the stochastic terms. Uncertainties are assumed to be
uncorrelated, i.e. E[θη] = 0. Note that the linearity of the marginal cost curve is a
result of the uniform distribution of c.10
The RA is also responsible for enforcing the regulation. Regardless of the imple-
mented regulatory instrument, countries are required to submit a report, indicating
9See Malcomson (1978) and Laﬀont (1977) for a discussion on Prices vs. Quantities if the
slopes of the marginal beneﬁt and cost curves are uncertain.
10If g(c) is a uniform distribution function of c, then g(c) = 1/C′′ where C′′ = (c − c) for
c ∈ [c,c].
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whether they are compliant or not. However, the correctness of these reports can
only be veriﬁed through costly inspections. The regulator randomly monitors those
countries, which claim to be in compliance. Countries are penalized by the RA
if inspections reveal a violation of the regulatory obligations. In this case, coun-
tries face a sanction with the monetary value F and the requirement to return to
compliance.11 The latter implies that countries have to ultimately reduce one unit
of pollution as their report indicates.12 All noncompliant countries face the same
penalty F.13 Note that under these circumstances, it is the dominant strategy for
all countries to send a report claiming compliance, whether this is true or not. As
a consequence, all countries face the same constant probability αi, i ∈ {t,q}, of
being inspected, where the subscript "t" refers to taxes, "q" to quantities. In order
to model the disadvantages of price-based regulations laid out in the introduction,
we assume that the enforcement probability for a quantity-based regime is higher
than for a price-based regime, i.e. αq > αt.
In the setup presented here, we assume an exogenous enforcement policy under
which αq, αt and F are given. The enforcement probabilities αq and αt are strictly
smaller than one, e.g. because of the RA’s limited monitoring budget. 14 The sanc-
tion F is insuﬃciently high to induce full compliance and is beyond the RA’s scope
as the penalty is a result of political negotiations. International regulations and
sanction mechanisms have to be accepted unanimously by all participants. Insuﬃ-
ciently large sanctions seem plausible, as some countries anticipate that they prefer
non-compliance once their actual costs of abatement are revealed.15 We therefore
assume that the above mentioned limitations lead to a situation where the permit
price, or the tax rate respectively, lie above the expected costs from noncompliance.
We continue with determining the countries’ compliance strategy for both policies
under incomplete enforcement before deriving the optimal policy design.
3 Compliance strategy under incomplete enforce-
ment
Under the price-based regime, the RA levies a uniform emission tax t. Countries are
monitored with probability αt. In the case of a quantity-based regulation, the RA
distributes a total amount of l pollution permits. It can be shown that there is no
diﬀerence whether the RA allocates pollution allowances for free or auctions them
oﬀ. Assume for the moment pollution permits are auctioned oﬀ. These allowances
are tradable at a market clearing price p.16 Countries are monitored with probability
αq.
11Penalty schemes forcing noncompliant participants to pay ﬁnes and to return to compliance
are rather the norm than the exception. In the Kyoto-Protocol, countries which do not meet their
targets have to over-fulﬁll their reduction target in the next commitment period by the respective
amount, plus 30% (see UNFCCC (2006)).
12We discuss a modiﬁed enforcement policy in section 7.
13Livernois and McKenna (1999) imposes a diﬀerent penalty scheme for noncompliance. Firms
which truthfully report their noncompliance have to pay a low ﬁne whereas ﬁrms claiming compli-
ance but found to be in violation during costly inspections have to pay a higher ﬁne.
14See among others Stigler (1970).
15In reality, monetary sanctions for noncompliance are rather low as it is argued in Livernois and
McKenna (1999) for national regulations . The imposition of severe sanctions on the international
level seems even more challenging.
16The market clearing condition will be established at the end of this section.
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Countries aim at minimizing costs but have to pay the sanction F and have to
reduce one unit of pollution if they are found to be in violation with the regulation.
Under these circumstances, the single country’s compliance strategy derived below
is the same as the one established in Montero (1999).
The set of countries can be divided in two subsets, depending on their marginal
abatement costs relative to the ’price’ per unit of emission x. The emission price
corresponds to the tax rate t under a price-regime and to the permit price p under
a quantity regime.
First, countries whose marginal abatement costs are lower than the ’price’ per emis-
sion, c < x, never consider paying x as part of their compliance strategy. In this
case, the respective countries prefer reducing their emissions and submit a truthful
compliance report as long as their marginal abatement costs are lower than their
expected costs of noncompliance, that is if
c < αi(F + c),
with i ∈ {t,q} and i = t for x = t, respectively i = q for x = p. The threshold





Hence, countries with very low marginal abatement costs, i.e. c ≤ c ≤ ˜ ci, reduce
one unit of pollution and submit a truthful compliance report. In contrast, countries
with higher marginal abatement costs, ˜ ci < c < x, do not comply, submit a false
report and claim to be in compliance.
Those countries whose marginal abatement costs are higher than the emission
’price’, i.e. c ≥ x, never consider reducing their emissions. These countries pay the
’price’ for emissions and submit a truthful compliance report as long as x is lower
than the expected costs of noncompliance, that is if
x < αi(F + c).
Note, this implies that countries found in violation are forced to abate. The thresh-






Those countries with very high marginal abatement costs, i.e. ˆ ci ≤ c ≤ c, pay
the ’price’ per unit of emission and submit a truthful compliance report. Finally,
countries with intermediate marginal abatement costs, i.e. x ≤ c < ˆ ci, prefer
noncompliance. They submit a false report and claim to be in compliance.
In summary, only countries with either very low marginal abatement costs—i.e.
c ≤ c ≤ ˜ ci—or very high marginal abatement costs— i.e. ˆ ci ≤ c ≤ c— fulﬁll their
legal obligations. They comply by reducing one unit of pollution or by paying the
’price’ x for one unit of emission. All other countries, ˜ ci < c < ˆ ci, never comply.
Those countries submit a false report and claim to be in compliance.
Note that these thresholds exist only if noncompliance is an attractive option for
countries. That is, at least for some countries the expected costs for noncompliance
have to be lower than the ’price’ per unit of emission x. For each regulatory regime,
we can hence deﬁne a penalty Fi which solves
αi(c + Fi) = x,
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as the minimum sanction which is necessary to induce full compliance. All countries
comply if the sanction F is set prohibitively high, i.e. F ≥ Fi, as noncompliance
would be too costly. In this case the threshold ˆ ci becomes irrelevant, as ˜ ci ≥ ˆ ci.17
Yet, we already argued that the enforcement parameters, F and αi, can be assumed
to be insuﬃciently large to induce full compliance. As we are interested in the case
where both instruments are subject to incomplete enforcement, we assume in the
following that for both instruments there exist some countries for which the expected
costs from violation are lower than the tax rate and the permit price respectively.
More formally, we establish Assumption 1, which holds throughout this paper.
Assumption 1. The sanction F is always lower than the minimum sanction, nec-
essary to induce full compliance in both regimes,




The fundamental diﬀerence between the policy instruments is the ’price’ per
unit of emission x. In a price-based regulation, the tax rate t is exogenously set by
the RA. In contrast, under a quantity approach, the permit price p is endogenously
determined by supply and demand of certiﬁcates. The equilibrium price of a per-






The left hand side of (3) determines the supply side of certiﬁcates. The RA of-
fers a total of l certiﬁcates. The right hand side determines the demand side of
the market. The demand for permits is driven by high cost countries that buy 1
certiﬁcate to comply.18 Furthermore, the market clearing condition indicates that
no noncompliant country returns to the market to buy certiﬁcates. Countries that
are found to be in violation with the regulation are forced to reduce one unit of
pollution as their report indicates.19
Substituting (2) into (3) yields the equilibrium permit price, pc, under certainty
about marginal costs and beneﬁts,
pc = αqG−1(1 − l) + αqF, (4)
17This is in line with the rationale presented in Becker (1968), according to which an increase
in enforcement probability and/or higher ﬁnes will decrease the amount of violations.
18Note that grandfathering is equivalent to auctioning. In case the RA allocates all pollution
permits for free, each single country holds an initial amount of l pollution permits. The threshold









which is identical to (3). The left hand side determines the supply side of certiﬁcates, i.e. low
cost compliant and all noncompliant countries. The right hand side determines the demand side
of the market, consisting of high cost countries buying (1 − l) certiﬁcates to comply. Hence, it is
irrelevant for the compliance strategy of countries whether the RA allocates all pollution permits
for free or auctions them oﬀ.
19Of course, this is cost ineﬃcient. Countries with marginal abatement costs higher than the
’price’ per unit of emission are forced to reduce domestically rather than paying the tax or purchas-
ing certiﬁcates.
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where G−1(1−l) reﬂects the marginal abatement costs just after (1−l) emissions
have been reduced. Hence, G−1(1−l) can be interpreted as the permit price pfull,
which would be observed under full compliance, i.e. if αq = 1 and F = 0.
It is important to see that quantity instruments, in contrast to price instru-
ments, are aﬀected by abatement cost uncertainty as the permit price varies. Under





The permit price is therefore given by
p(l,θ) = αqG−1(1 − l) + αqF + αqθ = pc + αqθ. (5)
The permit price is now stochastic. Whether the price is higher or lower than the
price under certainty, pc, depends on the realization of θ. Note further, incomplete
enforcement reduces permit price ﬂuctuations as noncompliance and the purchase
of certiﬁcates become imperfect substitutes (Montero (1999, 2002)). We now de-
termine the optimal policy design under incomplete enforcement and uncertainty
about costs and beneﬁts.
4 Optimal policy design with incomplete enforce-
ment and uncertainty
In the following we assume that the benevolent RA is aware of the countries’ compli-
ance strategy. Given the presence of incomplete enforcement, policy designs will be
second-best optimal.20 Including uncertainty, both policy instruments are ex-ante
second-best optimal. However, neither policy is likely to be ex-post optimal once
uncertainty is resolved.
The RA’s objective is to maximize expected net social beneﬁts from emission
reductions. Under a price-based regulation the RA chooses the tax level t that
maximizes
E[W(t,αt,θ,η)] = E[B(qt(t,αt,θ),η) − C(qt(t,αt,θ))]. (6)
Under a quantity regime, the regulator chooses the amount of emission permits
l to maximize
E[W(l,αq,θ,η)] = E[B(qq(l,αq,θ),η) − C(qq(l,αq,θ))]. (7)
The expected abatement costs and beneﬁts depend on the expected amount of
global emission reductions, qi, which are realized by low-cost countries and countries
that are caught violating the regulation. The expected amount of global emission








20Social welfare is reduced if policy makers implement a ﬁrst best policy into a second-best
world, see Montero (1999).
11 Juli 20104 Optimal policy design with incomplete enforcement and uncertainty








As we assume g(c) being a uniform distribution of c, the corresponding emission
reductions can be reduced to
qt(t,αt,θ) =




pc − c − (1 − αq)θ
C′′ . (9)
Note, with incomplete enforcement expected emission reductions are uncertain
under a quantity-based regulation which turns out to be a crucial advantage of
quantity-based over price-based instruments (Montero (1999, 2002)).




cg(c − θ)dc + αi
Z ˆ ci
˜ ci
cg(c − θ)dc. (10)
Substituting (8) and (10) into (6), and taking the derivative with respect to t, yields



















Taking expectations and solving the FOC for t yields the ex-ante second-best tax
under uncertainty
t∗ =
αt(bC′′ − cB′′ + FC′′)
C′′ − B′′αt
. (11)
In the case of a quantity regime, we derive the optimal amount of certiﬁcates
indirectly. Note that p as determined by (5) is a function of l. We therefore maximize
(7) over p and then derive the optimal amount of emission allowances. Substituting



















Taking expectations and solving the FOC for p yields the ex-ante second-best
permit price under uncertainty
p∗ =
αq(bC′′ − cB′′ + FC′′)
C′′ − B′′αq
. (12)
Replacing p by p∗ in (5), taking expectations, and solving for l, yields the ex-ante
second-best optimal amount of pollution permits, l∗.
Given these insights, we can establish the following propositions.
Proposition 1. t∗ < p∗
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The optimal permit price p∗, which results from allocating l∗ pollution
allowances, is higher than the optimal tax rate t∗ but lower than the
’price’ per unit of emission under complete enforcement.
Proof of Proposition 1: The tax rate and the permit price are identical under
complete enforcement (i.e. for αi = 1 and F = 0),
tfull = pfull =
bC′′ − cB′′
C′′ − B′′ . (13)
Substituting (2) into (5) and taking expectations yields ˆ cq = G−1(1 − l) = pfull.
Using p < ˆ c by construction, yields p∗ < pfull. The fact that p∗ = t∗ for αq = αt,
∂p∗/∂αq > 0 and 0 < αt < αq < 1 by construction, completes the proof.
Proposition 2. qt(t∗) < qq(l∗)
The expected amount of global emission reductions under incomplete
enforcement is lower than under complete enforcement. Emission re-
ductions under a price-based regulation, qt(t∗), are lower than under a
quantity-based regulation, qq(l∗).
The proof of this proposition is, given the proof of Proposition 1, straightforward,
and hence omitted here.
The fact that t∗ < p∗ and that qt(t∗) < qq(l∗) is an important feature of the ap-
proach presented here and a central diﬀerence to Montero (1999). As will be shown
below, instrument choice is crucially aﬀected by this feature. Most important for
our analysis is the fact that Proposition 1 implies that Assumption 1 will only be ful-




αq(C′′−B′′) . The latter inequality is hence the prerequisite for the
plausible case of incomplete enforcement for both policy instruments. Having thusly
speciﬁed the upper boundary for the range of possible sanctions considered here, we
can now proceed with deriving the welfare diﬀerence for both policy instruments.
5 Instrument choice
We now turn to the central question of our paper and calculate the expected diﬀer-
ence in social welfare of price-based over quantity-based instruments under incom-
plete enforcement, uncertain costs and beneﬁts and diﬀerent enforcement probabil-
ities, i.e.
∆pq = E[W(t∗,αt,θ,η) − W(l∗,αq,θ,η)]. (14)
Quantity-based regulation provides higher expected social welfare than price-
based regulation and ought to be preferred as regulatory instrument if ∆pq < 0.
Conversely, a price regime performs relatively better if ∆pq > 0.
Substituting (11), (12), qt(t∗), and qq(l∗) into (14), taking expectations, and










(1 − αq)(1 − αt)
−
(FC′′ + bC′′ − cB′′)2
(C′′ − αqB′′)(C′′ − αtB′′)
￿ (15)
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This equation is a main result of our paper and necessarily deserves to be dis-
cussed in more detail. First, note that under complete enforcement of both instru-
ments ( i.e. αq = αt = 1), equation (15) is reduced to the welfare diﬀerence
presented in Weitzman (1974). However, for incomplete enforcement with diﬀerent
enforcement probabilities, ∆pq features two additively separable eﬀects. Interest-
ingly, the cost uncertainty σ2
θ only enters into the ﬁrst eﬀect, while the enforcement
probability for the price regime αt only occurs within the second term. For this rea-
son we refer to the ﬁrst term as uncertainty eﬀect and to the second as diﬀerentiated
enforceability eﬀect.




2(C′′)2 [C′′ + B′′ + (1 − αq)B′′], is iden-
tical to the result derived in Montero (1999), yet speciﬁed for the enforcement
probability of quantity-based instruments. The dependence of αq can be deduced
from a speciﬁcation of the eﬀect’s rationale presented in Montero (1999, 2002). The
amount of emission reductions under a quantity approach varies under incomplete
enforcement and reacts to possible cost shocks. This aﬀects the aggregated costs
and beneﬁts from pollution abatement under a quantity instrument. The reason for
this is the multiplicative interaction of αq and θ, as speciﬁed by (9). Consequently,
compared to the full enforcement scenario, the beneﬁt advantage of a quantity ap-
proach reduces to (2−αq)αq, while the cost advantage of a price approach reduces
to αq. The latter dominates the former eﬀect, as (2 − αq)αq > αq. Hence, uncer-
tain emission reductions under a quantity-based instrument, qq(l,αq,θ), increase
the advantage of a quantity approach. The uncertainty eﬀect is thus negative and





The main novelty in equation (15) is in fact its lower term, which is neither
dependent on cost nor on beneﬁt uncertainty. This diﬀerentiated enforceability
eﬀect becomes zero and the overall welfare diﬀerence is identical to the one derived
in Montero (1999), if no diﬀerence in enforcement exists, i.e. αq = αt. However,
as laid out in the introduction, it is plausible to assume that the enforcement of a
quantity regime on the international level will be higher than that of a price scheme.
Therefore, the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect reﬂects the welfare eﬀects resulting
from the diﬀerence in enforcement for quantities and taxes. The main driver of this
welfare eﬀect is the diﬀerence in the expected amount of emission reductions for
the two policy regimes, as was summarized in Propositions 1 and 2. Hence, the sign
of the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect is unambiguously negative, as the expected
amount of pollution abatement under a quantity approach is higher than under a
price approach. The diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect hence measures the net gain
in social welfare from implementing the stricter enforceable policy instrument. This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For αq > αt and |B′′| = C
′′
(2−αq), the expected welfare diﬀerence
∆pq is strictly negative.
Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix A.1.
Hence, the welfare diﬀerence presented in (15) is, ceteris paribus, more likely
to be negative compared to the simple incomplete enforcement case analyzed in
Montero(1999, 2002). We can hence derive the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. If enforcement of quantity-based instruments is stricter than that of
price-based instruments the set of situations for which quantity-based instruments
ought to be preferred increases.
This result provides some formal support to the often-expressed opinion that,
as far as global externalities like climate change are concerned, instrument choice
should not be solely based on the relative-slope criterion. In order to give a notion
of the relative strength of the two potentially countervailing eﬀects in the welfare
diﬀerence, we provide numerical simulations in the following section. It is, however,
useful to ﬁrst proceed with a more thorough analysis of the analytical results.
Obviously, the choice of instrument is no longer solely determined by the relative
slopes of the marginal curves but also by institutionally determined variables αi as
well as level eﬀects. An increase in the intercepts of the marginal curves, i.e. b and
c, unambiguously strengthens the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect. An increase in
b shifts the marginal beneﬁt curve upwards, which increases the beneﬁts from emis-
sion reductions. Clearly, under incomplete enforcement, this becomes an important
determinant of the expected welfare from the instruments, as each actor violating
the regulation without being discovered decreases the welfare gains achieved. An in-
crease in c reduces ceteris paribus the optimal amount of pollution abatement. Yet,
given αq > αt, the reduction in qt would be larger than in qq. The diﬀerentiated
enforceability eﬀect becomes stronger with the level of the marginal curves, which
leads to an overall increase of the relative performance of the quantity instrument.
The eﬀect of a change in the enforceability of quantity-based regulations on instru-
ment choice is ambiguous. More countries initially comply and the diﬀerence in en-
forceability of the instruments increases with stricter enforcement of quantity-based
instruments. Clearly, this leads to a strengthening of the diﬀerentiated enforceability
eﬀect as the second best outcome under incomplete enforcement moves closer to
the ﬁrst best solution (complete enforcement). The advantage of quantity-based
instruments increases. On the other hand, an increase in αq also increases the
uncertainty eﬀect. The advantage of quantity-based over price-based regulations,
resulting from an uncertain amount of pollution abatement under a quantity ap-
proach, is reduced if the enforcement probability of quantity instruments increases.
Which of these two countervailing eﬀects dominates is in general ambiguous.
In contrast, stricter enforcement of price-based instruments unambiguously increases
the set of situation under which price-based regulations ought to be preferred. An
increase in αt reduces the diﬀerence in enforceability of the instruments. As a con-
sequence, the disadvantage of a price approach reduces with stricter enforcement
of price-based instruments as the optimal tax rate t∗ converges with the optimal
permit price p∗. This unambiguously diminishes the diﬀerentiated enforceability ef-
fect, whereas the uncertainty eﬀect is unaﬀected by a variation of αt. Hence, the
intuitively plausible rationale that a lower enforcement probability for price-based
regulations will render such instruments less attractive is conﬁrmed.
Further insights can be gained if (15) is simpliﬁed and rearranged as follows.
First, we assume c = 0. This implies that the country with the lowest marginal
costs can abate one unit of pollution without cost.21 Second, we introduce the ratio
β, measuring the relative slopes of the marginal beneﬁt curve and the marginal cost
21Note that this assumption is for many pollutants quite plausible. E.g., the intercept for
the abatement cost curve for Greenhouse Gases presented in Enkvist et al. (2007), lies even
below 0, at -150€/tCO2e (Euros per ton of carbon dioxide equivalents). Note that departing
from the assumption c = 0 would render quantity-based instruments even more favorable, as the
diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect strengthens with c.
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curve, with β = −B′′/C′′, where β ∈ R+. Both curves have the same absolute
slope if β = 1. The marginal abatement cost curve runs relatively steeper than the
marginal beneﬁt curve if β < 1 and is ﬂatter in the opposite case. Furthermore, we
express αt as a share k of the enforcement probability for quantity-based instruments,
i.e. αt = kαq, with k ∈]0,1[. Clearly, k represents a measure for the relative
enforceability of the two policy instruments. Taking all these modiﬁcations into
account, equation (15) can be re-written as:
∆pq =
σ2






(1 − αq)(1 − kαq)
−
(F + b)2
(1 + αqβ)(1 + kαqβ)
￿ (16)
With this reformulation, the eﬀects of a change in relative slopes, i.e. in β
become directly obvious. The ﬁrst term, still representing the uncertainty eﬀect,
unambiguously increases with a decrease in β, which reduces the relative perfor-
mance of quantity regulations. This comes to no surprise, as the uncertainty eﬀect
is in fact identical to the welfare diﬀerence calculated in Montero (1999), from
which an altered version of Weitzman’s relative slope criterion was derived. More
interesting is the eﬀect of a change in β on the second term in equation (16), which
still represents the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect. It is now directly obvious that
a decrease in β, i.e. a reduction of |B′′| relative to C′′, strengthens the diﬀerenti-
ated enforceability eﬀect. This can be explained by the fact that a decrease in β
results in a larger increase in emission reductions for the quantity regime than for
the price regime.22 As stated in Proposition 2, the emission reductions lie below
the ex ante ﬁrst-best level for both policy instruments. Hence, the expected second-
best optimum under a quantity approach will be closer to the ﬁrst best optimum
than under a price approach. Given that cost uncertainty does not inﬂuence the
diﬀerentiated enforcement eﬀect, the inﬂuence of the relative slopes β on this eﬀect
is hence quite intuitive.23
The independence of the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect of cost uncertainty,
also allows some further analytical considerations. Given that for β < 1/(2 − αq)
both eﬀects in (16) have diﬀerent signs, an increase in the variance also increases
the uncertainty eﬀect, which could outweigh the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect.
However, if the variance is small enough the relative slope criterion becomes irrel-
evant and quantity-based instruments ought to be always preferred as regulatory
instrument. Hence, it is possible to establish a level of the variance of costs σ2
θ,
below which quantity-based regulation will be always preferable, independent of the
relative slopes of the marginal cost and beneﬁt curves. The result is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For αq > αt, quantity-based regulation ought to be always preferred





22This can be easily seen by comparing qt(t∗) and qq(l∗) as determined by (8), (9),(11), and
(12).
23Note that if uncertainties are positively correlated, i.e. E[θη] > 0, an additional negative term
enters into (15), which further increases the advantage of quantity-based instruments.
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σ2
θ = (1 − k)
￿
(F + b)2(2 − αq)2
2(2 − αq(1 − k)
−
F2
(1 − αq)(1 − kαq)
￿
(17)
Proof : See Appendix A.2
An important implication of Proposition 4 is that the inclusion of diﬀerent en-
forcement probabilities signiﬁcantly alters the rationale commonly brought forward
in the debate on Prices vs. Quantities. First and most obviously, under the plausible
assumption of diﬀerent enforcement probabilities the relative slope criterion might
become entirely irrelevant for rational instrument choice. Whether this is the case
or not depends on the level of the variance of costs. Yet, this result is in itself in
conﬂict with the general insights from the literature on Prices vs. Quantities where
the uncertainty is generally considered to have no inﬂuence on rational instrument
choice.
Second, an increase in the level of the marginal beneﬁt curve, b, strengthens
the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect and hence the advantage of quantity-based
instruments. As a consequence, the level of σ2
θ increases with b. Hence, it can
be rightfully stated that if the level of marginal beneﬁt curve is large enough, the
importance of the relative slopes for instrument choice can become negligible. Again,
this result is in contradiction with the facts established thus far within the debate
on Prices vs. Quantities, where the level of the marginal beneﬁt curve is generally
considered to have no inﬂuence on instrument choice.
Third, with the inclusion of diﬀerent enforcement probabilities, optimal instru-
ment choice is also dependent on institutional variables. For example, the threshold
level σ2
θ unambiguously decreases in the diﬀerence in enforceability k. Hence, the
more diﬃcult the enforcement of a price regulation relative to a quantity regime is,
the larger is the set of situations for which the relative slope criterion is irrelevant
for instrument choice.
In order to provide a notion on the relevance of the above-made analytical con-
siderations, we present in the next section several numerical simulations of the ex-
pected diﬀerence in social welfare of price-based over quantity-based instruments by
using plausible parameter ranges taken from the example of anthropogenic climate
change.
6 Numerical Simulations
The above-presented analytical model is meant to conceptually identify in principle
the relative eﬀects of diﬀerentiated enforcement of environmental policies on the
international level. The model is not meant to be directly explanatory for an actual
real-world context. In order to get a notion of the relative strength of these eﬀects in
a speciﬁc situation numerical simulations with parameter combinations taken from a
real-world example are quite useful. While the actual levels of the results presented
below are to be interpreted with care, an observation of the general tendencies
are surely particularly interesting. Hence, in the following, we present the results
of numerical simulations based on parameter values derived from the context of
international climate policy.
We calculate the expected diﬀerence in social welfare of price-based over quantity-
based instruments ∆pq in dependence of the ratio of the slopes of the marginal
curves β. Table 1 gives an overview of the parameter values used for the numerical
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simulations. The level of C′′, B′′, σ2
θ and b correspond to the data presented in
Newell and Pizer (2003).24 Yet, the chosen level of the sanction F deserves a further
remark. We express the sanction F as a share γ of the sanction F deﬁned as the
smallest sanction which induces full compliance for at least one of both instruments,
i.e. F = γF with γ ∈]0,1[. Following Assumption 1, considering (11), (12) and
assuming c = 0, the smallest sanction which induces full compliance in at least one
regime is speciﬁed as F =
(1−αq)b
(1+β)αq.25 Obviously the allowed sanction decreases with
β. We therefore calculate the lowest sanction F for the relevant range of the ratio
of the slopes of the marginal curves. The relevant range in which the assumption
on diﬀerent enforcement probabilities for the regulatory regimes may aﬀect instru-
ment choice is β ∈ [0,1/(2 − αq)]. Given b = 9$/t and assuming αq = 0.8, yields
F ≈ 1.23$/t.
As already mentioned, in a real-world context the sanctioning mechanism estab-
lished in international treaties is entirely determined through political negotiations.
The scalar γ can hence be interpreted as a parameter reﬂecting the level of the
political determination of the member countries to actually commit to the agreed
policies. Clearly, the sanction will be relatively close to the full enforcement level
if polluters show a rather high level of commitment and expect to meet their reg-
ulatory obligations. Such a situation would correspond to a level of γ close to 1.
On the other hand, the sanction will be relatively low if a signiﬁcant number of
polluters expect to be in violation with the regulation.26 Such a political consensus
would be reﬂected by lower γ-values. In our speciﬁcation, we opted for choosing
somewhat optimistically γ = 0.8, which yields F ≈ 0.98$/t.27
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value
Slope of marginal costs (C′′) 1.6 ∗ 10−7$/t2
Slope of marginal beneﬁts (B′′) −8.7 ∗ 10−13$/t2
Cost uncertainty (σθ) 13$/t
b 9$/t
c 0$/t
Enforcement probability of quantity-based instruments (αq) 0.8
Sanction (F) 0.98$/t
Figure 1 illustrates the results of our numerical calculations based on (16). The
expected diﬀerence in social welfare is positive, indicating the superiority of price-
based regulation, if the curve is located in the ﬁrst quadrant. Quantity-based regu-
lations ought to be preferred if ∆pq takes negative values. For comparison we depict
also the results corresponding to the models presented in Weitzman (1974) (dotted
24See Newell and Pizer (1998) for details on the data.
25See Appendix A.1 for a detailed derivation of F.
26This could lead to an interaction between the level of uncertainty and the penalty, which is
not endogenously included in our model. However, such an endogenization would also have to
take the diﬀerences in bargaining power of the diﬀerent countries into account.
27The chosen level of the sanction F amounts to roughly 20% of the permit price and to 25%
(41%) of the tax rate for k = 0.75 (k = 0.375). For comparison, in the Kyoto Protocoll, countries
found in violation have to over-fulﬁll their reduction target in the next commitment period by the
respective amount, plus 30% (see UNFCCC (2006)). The here assumed sanction hence seems
appropriate.





Figure 1: ∆pq dependent on β
curve) and Montero (1999) (dashed curve). According to the classical relative-slope
criterion, price-based and quantity-based instruments perform equally if and only if
the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost curves have the same slope in absolute val-
ues, i.e. β = 1, which is the case for the dotted curve. As already explained,
incomplete enforcement increases the relative performance of quantity-based reg-
ulations (Montero (1999)), being illustrated in the dashed curve. The two curves
below depict two diﬀerent results derived from (16), assuming αq = 0.8. The curves
diﬀer in their assumption on the enforcement probability of price-based instruments
in order to illustrate the importance of the diﬀerence in enforcement probabilities.
We assume k = 0.75, corresponding to αt = 0.6, in the black curve and k = 0.375,
corresponding to αt = 0.3, in the light gray curve. Obviously, the diﬀerentiated
enforceability eﬀect has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on instrument choice, by favoring
quantity regulations, as the black and light gray curves are located strictly below
the dashed curve. As discussed in the previous section, a lower enforcement prob-
ability of price-based instruments further increases the diﬀerentiated enforceability
eﬀect. Hence, the light gray curve lies even below the black curve. Furthermore, the
diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect reduces with β. The light gray and black curves
hence converge with the result from simple incomplete enforcement (dashed curve)
for β → ∞.28
Yet, in the special case of regulating CO2 emissions, the assumption of Newell
and Pizer (2003) on the ratio of the slopes of the marginal curves corresponds to
β ≈ 5.4 × 10−6. That is, price-based instruments still ought to be preferred to
regulate CO2 emissions even though the enforcement of a quantity-based approach
is stricter than that of a price-based approach.
Interestingly, the example of climate change is particularly useful to give a notion
of an important feature of our result, which is the eﬀect of the level of the marginal











= 0 if we substitute F = γ · F with
γ ∈]0,1[ into the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect.





Figure 2: ∆pq dependent on β for b = 30
In the above-presented simulations we followed Newell and Pizer (2003) assuming
b = 9$/t for the initial marginal beneﬁt from pollution abatement.29 More recent
studies provide higher estimates for the level of marginal beneﬁts. According to
Downing et al. (2005) it is very likely that marginal beneﬁts exceed 50$/t. In Tol
(2005), 103 estimates from 28 published studies were gathered to form a probability
density function. Taking estimates only from peer-reviewed studies reduces the
mean to 50$/t. Further support for higher levels of b is given by the much discussed
results of the Stern Review from 2006, which presents estimates of the marginal
beneﬁts for a 450 − 550ppm CO2e concentration target at about 25 to 30$/t.30
31 32 In order to reﬂect the impact of changes in the level of the marginal beneﬁt
curve, suggested by these more recent estimates, we rerun our numerical simulations
assuming b = 30$/t. All other parameters remain unchanged, in order to be able to
compare the diﬀerent scenarios. The results are illustrated in Figure 2. As before,
we assume k = 0.75 in the black curve, respectively k = 0.375 in the light gray
curve. The dotted and dashed lines again depict the (unchanged) results based on
Weitzman (1974) and Montero (1999). Obviously, the results from (16) depicted
in the light gray and black curve of Figure 2 are strictly negative. That is, quantity-
based regulations ought to be always preferred, even though the beneﬁt curve is
close to being linear, i.e. β → 0. Arguing in terms of Proposition 4, the threshold
level σ2
θ, which is solely determined by institutional variables, became relevant. In




Figure 3 gives further insights into the relevance of the threshold level of the variance
29This estimation is comparable to estimates from Falk and Mendelsohn (1993) and Nordhaus
(1994).
30Following the ”Business as usual” trajectory, estimates for the marginal beneﬁts from emission
reductions approach 85$/t. (Stern (2006))
31See Yohe et al. (2007) for an overview on recent estimates for the marginal beneﬁts from
reducing CO2 emissions.
32Estimates of the marginal beneﬁts from pollution abatement of the above mentioned studies
refer to near future marginal beneﬁts. The initial marginal beneﬁt from pollution abatement can
hence be seen to be even higher.
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of costs. We calculate σ2
θ in dependence of the relative enforceability of the policy
instruments k and the level of the marginal beneﬁt curve b, assuming αq = 0.8 and
γ = 0.8. As already discussed in the previous section, the threshold level of the
variance of costs increases with b as the impact of the diﬀerentiated enforceability
eﬀect increases. The eﬀect of a change in the enforcement probability of price-based
instruments αt is reﬂected in a variation of k. The threshold level of the variance
of costs decreases with k and converges to zero, if enforcement of both regimes
is identical, corresponding to k → 1. The threshold σ2
θ thus increases with an
increase in the level of the marginal beneﬁt curve and a decrease in the enforcement
probability of price-based instruments. In order to highlight the relevance of the
threshold level of the variance of costs in the context of regulating CO2 emissions,
we include a plane representing the estimated variance presented in Newell and
Pizer (2003), i.e. σ2
θ = (13$/t)2. All σ2
θ-values above this plane fulﬁll Proposition
4. That is, a quantity-based approach performs always better than a price-based






θ dependent on k and b
7 Extension: An Alternative Enforcement Policy
In the above-described sections, it is assumed that a country found in violation
has to pay the sanction and is forced to comply with the regulation by reducing the
respective emission domestically. Evidently, this is ineﬃcient because countries with
marginal abatement costs higher than the tax rate or the permit price are forced
to abate pollution. In this section we extend the model by introducing a diﬀerent
enforcement policy. When found in violation, countries still have to pay a sanction
but can now decide whether to comply through domestic abatement or by paying
the tax or permit price instead. Hence, the model changes as follows:
The cut-oﬀ points for a truthful compliance report of low-cost countries (c < pn
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In contrast to the previous enforcement policy, high-cost ﬁrms never consider reduc-
ing emissions but rather pay the tax or buy certiﬁcates to meet their obligations.
The upper cut-oﬀ point for a truthful compliance report becomes
ˆ c = c,
because Assumption 1 still has to be satisﬁed. Low cost countries, c ≤ c ≤ ˜ ci,
comply whereas high costs countries, ˜ ci < c ≤ c, never comply.










g(c − θ) (18)









g(c − θ). (19)
under a quantity regime. The welfare maximizing tax under a price-based regulation
is
tn∗ =
B′′Fαt + C′′b − B′′c
C′′ − B′′αt
. (20)
In case of a quantity-based regulation, the permit price again follows a market






pn(ln,θ) = G−1(1 −
ln
αq
) + θ = pn
c + θ (21)
The demand for permits is driven by countries with high marginal abatement
costs (c ≥ p) which are found to be in violation and are forced back into compliance.
These countries prefer to buy certiﬁcates rather than to abate domestically. If cer-
tiﬁcates are auctioned oﬀ, the RA supplies ln allowances. In case of grandfathering,
all types of countries sell their certiﬁcates, since low cost countries reduce emissions
and high cost countries never comply. As before, we maximize the expected social
welfare over pn, which yields
pn∗ =
B′′Fαq + C′′b − B′′c
C′′ − B′′αq
. (22)
Replacing pn by pn∗ in (21), solving for ln, and taking expectations yields the
second-best optimal amount of pollution permits, ln∗.
There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between this new and the previous enforcement
policy. We therefore establish
33The superscript "n" refers to the new enforcement policy.
34As in the previous enforcement policy, pn
c denotes the equilibrium permit price under certainty.
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Proposition 5. pn∗ < tn∗
The distribution of ln∗ certiﬁcates results in a permit price pn∗ which
is lower than the optimal tax rate tn∗, but higher than the ’price’ per
unit of emission under complete enforcement.
Proof of Proposition 5: Using the fact that pn
full = tn
full under complete
enforcement (e.g. if F = 0 and αi = 1), pn∗ = tn∗ for αq = αt, considering
Assumption 1, ∂pn∗/∂αq < 0 and 0 < αt < αq < 1 by construction, completes the
proof.
Note, despite the fact that Proposition 1 does no longer hold, Proposition 2
remains valid. The expected amount of pollution abatement is the same under
both enforcement policies, i.e. qn
t (tn∗) = qt(t∗), respectively qn
q (ln∗) = qq(l∗).
We again calculate the expected diﬀerence in social welfare of price-based over
quantity-based instruments under uncertainty and diﬀerent enforcement probabili-
ties, ∆pq. Substituting (20), (22), qn
t (tn∗), and qn
q (ln∗) into (14), taking expecta-
tions, assuming E[θη] = 0, and rearranging terms yields the expected diﬀerence in









(1 − αq)(1 − αt)
−
(FC′′ + bC′′ − cB′′)2
(C′′ − αqB′′)(C′′ − αtB′′)
￿
which is identical to (15). This result was to be expected as Proposition 2 still holds.
We establish
Proposition 6. Incomplete enforcement with diﬀerent enforcement probabilities
aﬀects instrument choice (see Proposition 3). Whether noncompliant countries
found to be in violation can choose their compliance strategy or are forced to
reduce domestically, does not aﬀect instrument choice.
The proof is obvious and therefore omitted here.
Proposition 6 has important implications for policy recommendations. Compli-
ance rules may enjoin the exclusion of polluters which failed to meet their regulatory
obligations from certiﬁcate trading respectively tax payments. Polluters are then
forced to reduce domestically regardless of their reduction costs. Other regulations
let emitters decide how to meet their obligation. Yet, as Proposition 6 argues,
enforcement rules do not alter instrument choice.
8 Conclusion
This paper compares the relative performance of price-based and quantity-based
instruments to regulate an international externality, such as climate change. In
this context it is often argued, that due to reasons of ﬁscal sovereignty, the en-
forceability of price-based regulations is lower than for tradable quantity restrictions.
For our analysis, we extended the framework established in Montero (1999) to re-
ﬂect diﬀerent enforcement probabilities for international price and quantity regimes.
As a contribution to the Prices vs. Quantities debate, we calculated the expected
welfare diﬀerence of price-based over quantity-based instruments under uncertain
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abatement costs and beneﬁts, incomplete enforcement, and diﬀerent enforcement
probabilities.
Interestingly, the eﬀects of cost uncertainty under incomplete enforcement and
of diﬀerences in the enforcement probabilities can be divided into two additively
separable terms. The former ’uncertainty’ eﬀect is similar to the results presented in
Montero (1999, 2002) for the enforcement probability of quantity-based instruments.
This eﬀect is crucial for the comparative advantage of a quantity approach resulting
from uncertain emission reductions. The relative slopes of the marginal curves
remain the main determinants for the direction of this eﬀect. In contrast, the latter
’diﬀerentiated enforceability’ eﬀect, measuring the gain in net beneﬁts from using
the stricter enforceable policy instrument, always favors a quantity approach. This
eﬀect depends crucially on the level of the marginal curves and on institutionally
determined parameters.
The relative slope criterion ﬁrst derived in Weitzman (1974) is commonly brought
forward in order to argue in favor of a price- (e.g. emission tax) or a quantity-based
(e.g. tradable pollution permits) approach. We ﬁnd that many facts established
within the Prices vs. Quantities debate, have to be reconsidered as soon as dif-
ferences in enforceability are taken into account. First of all, the level of cost
uncertainty, which does not have an inﬂuence on optimal policy choice in Weitz-
man (1974) and Montero (1999), turns out to be a crucial factor. We show that
there exists a threshold level of cost variance, below which a quantity instrument
ought to be always preferred as regulatory instrument, irrespective of the relative
slopes of the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost curve. This threshold level is
determined by institutional variables and level eﬀects. The level of the marginal
beneﬁt curve is also an important determinant of the relative performance of both
instruments, which is, again in contradiction with the established facts of the Prices
vs. Quantities debate.
In order to give a notion of the intensity of the aggregated eﬀects, we present
the results of numerical simulations based on data gathered in the climate change
context. Our calculations show that the expected level of the marginal beneﬁt curve,
which is subject to dispute, signiﬁcantly aﬀects rational instrument choice. While
with the estimates presented in Newell and Pizer (2003), a price-based regulation
seems still preferable, the situations changes in favor of a quantity regime if the
higher estimates of more recent meta-studies are taken into account. Moreover, the
threshold level of the variance of costs becomes relevant for plausible parameter
values, suggesting the use of quantity-based instruments to regulate CO2 emissions
for any ratio of the slopes of the marginal curves.
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A Appendix
A.1 Diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect
We prove that the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect under incomplete enforcement
is always negative if αq > αt.
In order to prove this, we specify the sanction F for which noncompliance is an
attractive option for countries under both regimes. Following Assumption 1, using
(11) and (12) requires
F <
(1 − αq)(bC′′ − cB′′)
αq(C′′ − B′′)
<
(1 − αt)(bC′′ − cB′′)
αt(C′′ − B′′)





as the sanction which induces full compliance in at least one of the regimes. We
express F as a function of F, i.e.
F = γF (23)










(γ(1 − αq) + (1 + β)αq)2
(1 + αqβ)(1 + αtβ)
￿
.
As (1 − αq)/(1 − αt) < 1 for αq > αt, the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect is
negative if
(γ(1 − αq) + (1 + β)αq)2
γ2(1 + αqβ)(1 + αtβ)
≥ 1
which is always the case for αq > αt, γ ∈]0,1[ and β ∈ R+.
The diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect is thus always negative. Q.e.d.
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A.2 Cost variance
We show that ∆pq is always negative, if σ2
θ < σ2
θ. For this, we deﬁne the uncertainty
respectively the diﬀerentiated enforceability eﬀect as a function of the relative slopes











(1 − αq)(1 − αt)
−
(b + F)2
(1 + βαq)(1 + βαt)
￿
. (25)
For ∆pq ≤ 0 it has to be shown, that
Ψ(β,σ2
θ) + Ω(β) ≤ 0. (26)
We know from Appendix A.1 that
Ω(β) < 0, ∀β ∈ R+.
The sign of Ψ(β,σ2
θ) is ambiguous but strictly negative for β > 1
2−αq. Hence,



































− β) ≥ 0}.
We set up the Lagrangian maximization problem





















(αq − αt)(αq + αt + 2αqαtβ)(F + b)2
2C′′(1 + βαq)2(1 + βαt)2 , (30)
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Substituting β = 0 in (24) and β = 1
2−αq in (25), replacing αt = kαq, assuming
c = 0, and solving (26) for σ2
θ, yields a suﬃcient condition for the threshold level
σ2
θ = (1 − k)
￿
(F + b)2(2 − αq)2
2(2 − αq(1 − k)
−
F2
(1 − αq)(1 − kαq)
￿
below which ∆pq is always negative. Q.e.d.
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